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1. Introduction
Individual selection has been extremely powerful in explaining both human and animal
behavior. However, both empirical and experimental studies have found evidence that
humans and animals to some degree have social preferences.1 Several mechanisms to
foster social preferences have been advanced in the literature. Nowak (2006) discusses
￿I am grateful to the Wallenberg Foundation for ￿nancial support. I am also grateful for comments
from CØdric Argenton, Christoph Kuzmics, Olof Leimar, Erik Mohlin, Arne Traulsen, and J￿rgen
Weibull. Any errors are my own. Email: marcus.salomonsson@hhs.se
1The evidence on social preferences is surveyed in Dawes and Thaler (1988), Ledyard (1995), and
Gintis, Bowles, Boyd, and Fehr (2003).
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￿ve of them.2;3 They are kin selection, direct and indirect reciprocity, networks,4 and
group selection. All ￿ve mechanisms, at least in their modern forms, are within the
sel￿sh paradigm. They all amount to saying that an organism may appear to have social
preferences, but that these preferences can be explained by appealing to sel￿shness.
Kin selection was formally analyzed by Hamilton (1964). The idea, popularized by
Dawkins (1976), is that organisms are vehicles for genes to spread. Genes thus have
sel￿sh reasons to in￿ uence their organism into helping other organisms with the same
gene. This implies that it is rational for parents to help their o⁄spring, and for siblings
to help each other etc. The principle is illustrated by Haldane￿ s famous quote that he
would sacri￿ce his life for ￿two brothers or eight cousins￿ .
Direct and indirect reciprocity concern repeated interactions. Direct reciprocity,
advanced by Trivers (1971), refers to a situation where these interactions take place
between the same individuals. Indirect reciprocity instead refers to situations where
the interactions take place between new individuals but where each individual has a
reputation acquired through earlier interactions.5
Network models build on the idea that if individuals interact within smaller clusters,
then this may foster cooperation. Typically, as in Eshel et al (1998), it both reduces the
gain from deviating and the cost of cooperating by reducing the number of interactions.6
Group selection also involves interactions in smaller clusters, however, there is more
to it than just a local interaction. There is also some kind of competition between
groups. In this survey I will consider three basic approaches to group selection. The
￿rst approach is the ￿xation approach, where the crucial element is the existence of
pure groups. The second approach is the assortative group formation approach, where
there is a correlation between being a certain type and being matched with others of
that type. The third approach is the reproductive externalities approach, where group
competition makes it possible to internalize externalities.7
2Another recent overview of the evolution of cooperation and altruism is provided by Leimar and
Hammerstein (2006).
3Regardless of how social preferences have been selected for, it should be noted that they are prob-
ably not calibrated for all conceivable situations. Instead, they should rather be suited for situations
that are, or have been, common to the organism. In fact, to preserve resources, preferences may not
even be perfectly tuned for such situations. It may be more economical to have rule of thumb prefer-
ences. For example, a predisposition towards cooperation is not always bene￿cial. However, in most
cases it may be. If the predisposition is not su¢ ciently costly, compared to the resources saved, it may
be preserved. Thus, in a broader sense, when resources are taken into account, the preferences may
still be optimal.
4Nowak uses the term network reciprocity. I will instead only call these models network models,
to emphasize that repeated interactions are not needed. These models are also called spatial models.
Nowak argues that the more general term network is better suited.
5In game theory direct and indirect reciprocity are often treated as variants of the Folk theorems,
formally analyzed by Aumann (1959), Friedman (1971), Rubinstein (1979), and Fudenberg and Maskin
(1986). The Folk theorems imply that if a Prisoner￿ s Dilemma is repeated inde￿nitely, and with a
su¢ ciently high discount factor, then there exists several subgame perfect Nash equilibria, some of
which consist of cooperation in every period.
6Other examples are Ellison (1993) and Ohtsuki and Nowak (2006).
7The term externality is widely used in Economics. In Biology the term biproduct is typically used.
The terms refer to the e⁄ects of an action that were not the reason for that action to be taken. If an
externality is internalized, then the initiator of the action is made to take into account these e⁄ects.GROUP SELECTION: THE QUEST FOR SOCIAL PREFERENCES 3
There is some disagreement in the literature as to what the exact de￿nition of kin
selection should be. Lehmann et al (2007) write that ￿kin selection operates whenever
interactions occur among genetic relatives, that is, among individuals who tend to share
a more recent common ancestor than individuals sampled randomly from the whole
population.￿ This is a very broad de￿nition which implies that all of Nowak￿ s ￿ve
mechanisms are kin selection as soon as the interaction is ￿among individuals who tend
to share a more recent common ancestor than individuals sampled randomly from the
whole population￿ . For example, two siblings engaged in repeated interactions would
always fall under kin selection and never under direct reciprocity.8 This de￿nition thus
makes it impossible to disentangle di⁄erent e⁄ects from each other whenever relatives
are engaged in an interaction. In the papers treated in this survey this is not an issue.
In fact, although the word ￿o⁄spring￿is often used, the possibility that individuals may
have the same gene, and may help each other for that reason, is simply neglected. This
implies that for all practical purposes the individuals are not related and kin selection
is not an issue. This interpretation of kin selection is in line with the de￿nition implied
by Nowak (2006): ￿When evaluating the ￿tness of the behavior induced by a certain
gene, it is important to include the behavior￿ s e⁄ect on kin who might carry the same
gene.￿
The term inclusive ￿tness has come to be more general than kin selection. For ex-
ample, Ricklefs and Miller (2001) de￿ne inclusive ￿tness as ￿the ￿tness of an individual
plus the ￿tness of its relatives, weighted according to the coe¢ cient of relatedness￿ . In
addition, Grafen (2007) argues that relatedness should be understood as ￿genetic sim-
ilarity, however caused, whether by common ancestry, assortation of genotypes or kin
recognition￿ . Thus, according to this de￿nition, two individuals having a larger genetic
similarity than the rest of the population, but not sharing the same ancestry in any
higher degree than the rest of the population, should fall under inclusive ￿tness, but not
under kin selection. Note that this de￿nition excludes two individuals having a larger
phenotypic similarity than the rest of the population, but di⁄erent relevant genotypes.9
As with kin selection, also the broader concept of inclusive ￿tness is irrelevant in the
papers treated in this survey. In fact, even in the papers treating assortative group
formation inclusive ￿tness is disregarded, and is thus irrelevant.
The paper is organized as follows. First I discuss two symmetric 2 ￿ 2￿games -
Coordination Games and Prisoner￿ s Dilemma games - where group selection is especially
relevant. Group selection may of course also be relevant for more complex games, but
these games illustrate neatly the two issues that group selection can address. The ￿rst
issue is the problem of equilibrium selection: If there are several equilibria, can group
selection tell us anything about which equilibrium will be played? The second issue is
the problem of social preferences: Can group selection lead to locally altruistic behavior
being viable? After going through the games and brie￿ y discussing the main arguments
of the various approaches, I go on and describe the early literature on group selection,
up to the group selection controversy. Then I consider the more recent literature,
8In particular, Lehmann et al argue that kin selection and group selection is the same process when
groups are rarely reshu› ed.
9The genotype is the genetic constitution of an organism, whereas the phenotype is the observable
characteristic of the organism. Thus, di⁄erent genotypes may result in the same phenotype.GROUP SELECTION: THE QUEST FOR SOCIAL PREFERENCES 4
and consider the three main approaches to group selection that have been formally
explored.10 Finally, I conclude.
2. Preliminaries
To ￿x ideas, let us consider two symmetric 2 ￿ 2 games where group selection is of
special interest.11 Originally, the payo⁄s in these games were considered to be von
Neumann-Morgenstern utilities, and still generally are. However, here we interpret the
payo⁄s as ￿tness, typically the number of o⁄spring.
2.1. Coordination Games. In this class of games there are two Nash equilibria in





One Nash equilibrium is for both players to play A. Then they both get a payo⁄ of 1
each. The other pure equilibrium is for both players to play B. Then they both get a
payo⁄ of 2 each.
In evolutionary settings, we often think of a large population. We randomly draw
two individuals from the population and let them play the game against each other. The
payo⁄s are then the o⁄spring that the individuals get. Thus, if su¢ ciently many in the
population play A, then individuals playing A will get a higher payo⁄ than individuals
playing B. Thus, everybody playing A can be an equilibrium outcome despite the fact
that the equilibrium where everybody plays B yields more.
Potentially, a group selection model could eliminate the low-yield equilibrium. A
very basic model would be to randomly divide the population into groups, and then
randomly draw two individuals from each group and let them play a Coordination
Game. The individuals and their o⁄spring are then returned to the group they came
from. If the population is large and groups are formed randomly, then some groups
will converge to the high-yield equilibrium while others will converge to the low-yield
equilibrium. Since individuals in the groups that converge to the high-yield equilibrium
earn more, they will outgrow the individuals in the low-yield groups.
This sketchy model is in fact only a network model. There is a group structure,
but no group selection. However, if we would dissolve groups at some probability - and
let them be replaced by new groups formed by individuals from high yielding groups
- then we e⁄ectively have a group selection model. Canals and Vega-Redondo (1998)
have constructed such a model. They consider a subset of Coordination Games, called





10I can unfortunately not claim to have covered all papers treating group selection. For other surveys
of the vast group selection literature, see Sober and Wilson (1998) and Bergstrom (2002). Dugatkin
(2002) and Henrich (2004) also have extensive discussion of the concept.
11For a complete categorization of symmetric 2 ￿ 2￿games, see Weibull (1995).GROUP SELECTION: THE QUEST FOR SOCIAL PREFERENCES 5
Again, one of the equilibria, namely when everybody plays A, has a higher payo⁄. This
equilibrium is the Pareto dominant equilibrium. However, the low-yield equilibrium is
now a bit di⁄erent from before. Imagine that player 1 has no idea what player 2 will
play, and thus assumes that he will play A or B with equal probability. Then player
1 would achieve a higher expected payo⁄ by playing B. This equilibrium is called the
risk dominant equilibrium. Another way of understanding the concept is to say that
the risk dominant equilibrium has the largest basin of attraction.
In two very in￿ uential papers, Kandori, Mailath, and Rob (1993) and Young (1993)
showed that, in a standard one-population setting with mutations, the population would
spend most of its time close to the risk dominant equilibrium. The reason is that
fewer mutations are needed for a population to shift from the Pareto optimal basin
of attraction to the risk dominant basin of attraction than vice versa. As a result,
a population process with mutations would spend most of its time close to the risk
dominant equilibrium. Since there is no group selection in a network model, this will
also be the case in these models, as demonstrated by Ellison (1993). Indeed Ellison
showed that convergence to the risk dominant equilibrium will be faster in a network
model.
However, in a group selection model, the result may be completely di⁄erent. Groups
in the Pareto optimal equilibrium would spread faster than groups in the risk dominant
equilibrium. This may compensate for the fact that mutations are more likely to take
the group from the Pareto optimal equilibrium to the risk dominant equilibrium, rather
than the other way around. As we will see, Canals and Vega-Redondo (1998) show that
this is indeed the case when the mutation rate approaches zero.12
2.2. Prisoner￿ s Dilemma games. In this class of games, group selection has been
more controversial. The game (3) is a Prisoner￿ s Dilemma game. Here both players will
play D in equilibrium, despite the fact that if they could commit to playing C, they





The strategy C is often referred to as an altruistic strategy: The reason is that by playing
C a player confers a bene￿t on the other player while in￿ icting harm on himself.
A network model in this context would again be to divide the population into groups.
Again high-yield groups, i.e. those with many altruists, should grow faster than low-
yield groups. However, now the situation is di⁄erent compared to the Coordination
Games. Within each group the best response is to defect. This means that although
groups with many altruists may earn more than other groups, each altruist will earn
less than a defector in his group. As a result, in the long run the population should
converge to everybody defecting.
A theoretical possibility to avoid such an outcome is if neither migration nor muta-
tions are allowed and all players in at last one group play the pure strategy C. Then
12One could also assume that individuals would migrate from low yielding to high yielding groups,
which would favor the Pareto optimal equilibrium rather than the risk dominant equilibrium. Oechssler
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that group will grow much faster than the other groups and eventually overtake them.
Although such models are really network models, they have historically been called
group selection models or Haystack models. To somewhat adhere to this tradition I
will call them group selection models based on ￿xation.
Yet another example of a network model often presented as a group selection model
is what I will call group selection models based on assortative group formation. In these
models there is again no actual competition between groups, but rather a correlation
between playing C and ending up in groups where others also play C:
An easy way to extend a network model into a group selection model is to assume
that groups are wiped out - with everybody in the group receiving the payo⁄ 0 - with
a probability negatively dependent on the sum of payo⁄s in the group. For example,
consider groups of two players. Suppose that groups with only cooperators never are
wiped out, whereas mixed groups are wiped out with the probability 0.5, and defecting
groups always are wiped out. Then the expected pro￿t of a cooperator in a pure group
is 4, whereas it is 1 in mixed groups. The expected pro￿t of a defector is 2.5 in mixed
groups and 0 in pure groups. If we start o⁄with an equal proportion of cooperators and
defectors in the population, and group formation is completely random, then a player
has an equal probability of ending up in a pure group or a mixed group. As a result,
a cooperator￿ s expected payo⁄ is 2.5, while a defector￿ s expected payo⁄ is 1.25. Thus,
a cooperator has a higher expected payo⁄ than a defector. Models of this type will be
called group selection models based on reproductive externalities.
Before we turn to these three approaches to group selection I will brie￿ y discuss the
early group selection literature and the group selection controversy.
3. Early contributions
Fittingly, it was Darwin who made the ￿rst allusion to group selection in The Descent
of Man and Selection in Relation to Sex.13 The following sentence is often quoted:
￿There can be no doubt that a tribe including many members who, from pos-
sessing in a high degree the spirit of patriotism, ￿delity, obedience, courage,
and sympathy, were always ready to give aid to each other and to sacri-
￿ce themselves for the common good, would be victorious over most other
tribes, and this would be natural selection.￿(Darwin (1871), page 166.)
Thus, Darwin saw that social preferences could be developed through natural selec-
tion. In addition he seems to have held the view that it was some form of competition
between groups that would foster these social preferences.
Carr-Saunders (1922) thought that group selection fostered social evolution only
among humans. He argued that it came about in primitive societies. These societies
were nominally thought to be nomad societies, but Carr-Saunders argued that they were
in fact restricted to a territory, within which they evolved social conventions to optimize
the potential for long-term survival. Through abstention, abortion, and infanticide,
they restricted their numbers so that an optimum number was reached. At this number
13Allee (1943) traces the idea ￿of natural cooperation￿all the way back to the Greek philosopher
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of individuals, the income per head was maximized. These social conventions served
to avoid more Malthusian methods of population control, the objective being to avoid
social instability.14
Among the early contributions, Wright (1945), was the only one to construct a
mathematical model. The aim was to show that a ￿character of value to the popula-
tion, but disadvantageous at any given moment to the individual￿could survive. He
noted that if such a character - or strategy in game theoretical terminology - completely
dominated a group, then that group would grow much faster than other groups. How-
ever, if a sel￿sh strategy appeared in the group - either by mutation or migration - it
would take over the group and the altruistic strategy would disappear.
Wright thus noted that isolation and ￿xation of the group was necessary for an
altruistic trait to be preserved. His idea seems to be based on several groups that are
isolated for long times. He argued that drift - i.e. random occurrences in reproduction -
could lead to complete domination of altruists in a group. Once ￿xation had occurred,
there would be no way for the sel￿sh trait to reappear in the group, barring mutations
and migration. The group would then reproduce much faster than other groups. Even-
tually, after a long period of isolation, a migration phase would ensue. The group would
then spread over the world and a new phase of isolation would follow. A group would
eventually drift into ￿xation, and the cycle would restart.
By stressing isolation and ￿xation, and the trade-o⁄between migrating altruists and
resident egoists, Wright anticipated the haystack model of Maynard Smith (1964). The
main conceptual di⁄erence is that, as we will see, Maynard Smith considered group
formation to be the phase where the altruists had the largest chance of completely
dominating a group.
Wynne-Edwards (1962), somewhat like Carr-Saunders (1922), was concerned with
the problem of resource management. In particular he wanted to construct a theory to
explain how a species, or a group from a species, managed resources to avoid extinction.
He drew the parallel to the North Paci￿c Sealing Convention of 1911. This treaty was
an attempt to curb the over￿shing of seal in the North Paci￿c. It came into place after
several years of con￿ ict between ￿shing vessels from various countries, spurred by the
scarcity of seals.
If humans could come up with such a treaty - Wynne-Edwards thought - would not
animals also be able to construct similar conventions to avoid excessive consumption of
resources?15 He argued that such conventions could also explain why animals were often
not living on subsistence levels. He noted that on the fringes of a species￿territory they
often did. However, in the centers they were in good health - ￿and sometimes actually
fat￿ .16 Thus, he wanted to ￿nd a theory that did not depend on famine, predators,
or diseases, but instead depended on social conventions within a territory, group, or
14Williams (1966) discusses the advantage of a low variability in numbers. A high variability implies
a higher risk of going extinct.
15Although he saw humans as able to form social conventions to manage resources, Wynne-Edwards
(1963) argued that modern societies had ceased to manage their own numbers, and in that sense
provided ￿a spectacular exception to the general rule.￿
16This would not surprise present day Economists, who would argue that individuals on the fringe
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species, that optimized the potential for long-term survival within the territory, or of
the group or species.
Interestingly, it seems that he did not think of these conventions as being necessarily
upheld by strictly altruistic behavior. Instead, he hypothesized that enforcement of
population control would not depend on the parents in each case, but instead on other
individuals in the group. By interpreting his theory in this way, group selection would
not be needed. Instead it would su¢ ce to say that when resources become scarce,
then parents have an interest in killing other parent￿ s o⁄spring, which squares well
with individual selection. On the other hand, Wynne-Edwards explicitly states that
social conventions are based on group selection. He noted that group selection and
individual selection might be in con￿ ict, but then argued that group selection would
always prevail. The reason, as he saw it, was that if it did not, then the species would
go extinct.
4. The controversy
The group selection controversy broke out as a result of Wynne-Edwards (1962). May-
nard Smith (1964) commented on a companion paper, Wynne-Edwards (1963), and
dismissed Wynne-Edwards￿theory. Maynard Smith argued that most of the observa-
tions that Wynne-Edwards claimed corroborated his theory in fact could just as easily,
if not more easily, be explained by individual selection. However, he also went ahead
and constructed a mathematical model as to how group selection could work. This
model became known as the Haystack model.
The model consists of a ￿eld with haystacks. A pregnant mouse is placed under
each haystack as it is created. The mice then procreate in the haystacks without any
migration between them. In the end of each period the haystacks are collected, and the
mice are put into one common population. New haystacks are then constructed and a
new pregnant mouse, drawn from the new population, is placed under each. The mice
can be of two types; aggressive mice, A; who breeds at the same rate irrespectively of
the group size; and timid mice, a; who stop breeding when the group reaches a certain
size.
Groups starting o⁄ with only aggressive mice will eventually run out of resources
and will have a period of starving. However, Maynard Smith excludes the possibility
that the mice actually go extinct. In groups with both aggressive and timid mice, both
breed at the same rate until the population reaches the timid mice￿ s limit. At this limit,
the timid mice stop breeding and the aggressive mice take over the group completely.
Since their resource management has been slightly better than the group with only
aggressive mice, starving starts later in these groups. Finally, in groups that start o⁄
with only timid mice, they breed optimally and avoid starving towards the end of the
period.
Thus, the model has some features that stand out. First, as already noted, ag-
gressive mice breed aggressively enough to starve, but not aggressively enough to go
extinct, which already Wynne-Edwards￿noted in his comment to the paper. Second,
in mixed groups the timid mice go completely extinct. This feature may be a shortcut
to illustrate that the period under the haystack is very long, or at least su¢ ciently long
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Thus, since groups of aggressive mice do not go extinct, and since timid mice in
mixed groups go extinct, the model is biased against timid mice. Nevertheless, the result
is that if only isolation is long enough, then the ratio of timid mice in the population
will increase. The reason being that groups with only timid mice will grow very large.
However, the general feeling among readers was that these long periods of absolute
isolation were unrealistic, at least if this type of group selection should be a feature
with wide applicability.
A further blow to the group selection argument was Williams (1966). Williams
elaborated on Maynard Smith￿ s argument that most of the phenomena ascribed to
group selection could be explained by individual selection. Just like Maynard Smith,
Williams did not reject group selection ￿ at out, but insisted that the limited possibility
of ￿nding phenomena that group selection, but not individual selection could explain,
suggested that it was a very weak force.
Williams argued that natural selection required a certain stability among the entities
being selected for. Genes, for example, are fairly stable. There might be mutations, but
overall they are fairly rare. Groups, on the other hand, are in constant ￿ ux, primarily
due to migration. Furthermore, an individuals is fairly short-lived, while groups have
longer time-spans. This also limits the possibility of more ￿t groups to replace less ￿t
ones.
In sum, the papers by Maynard Smith and Williams were very in￿ uential. They ef-
fectively dismissed group selection in the form advanced by Carr-Saunders and Wynne-
Edwards. Maynard Smith￿ s Haystack model also for a long time became the benchmark
group selection model.
5. Fixation
The contributions of Wright (1945), and Maynard Smith (1964) stressed the importance
of ￿xation, i.e. pure groups, for group selection to have any e⁄ect. The underlying
idea is that mixed groups will degenerate over time. Pure groups are thus needed
for cooperators to survive and eventually thrive. Wright thought of these pure groups
coming into existence through drift, while Maynard Smith thought of them coming into
existence when groups were formed.
Eshel (1972) extended the ￿xation approach to focus on migration. He con￿rmed
Wright￿ s conjecture that altruistic traits will dominate the population if migration is
su¢ ciently low. Eshel also argued that an innovation that increases mobility would
lead to less altruism.
Traulsen and Nowak (2006) provide a link between ￿xation models and the repro-
ductive externality models treated later.17 They divide a population into groups and
let the individuals in each group play an n-person prisoner￿ s dilemma game. A sin-
gle individual is chosen for reproduction with a probability proportional to its ￿tness.
The o⁄spring is put into the same group. When a group reaches the size n two things
can happen: With probability q the group is split into two groups and another group
is eliminated. With probability 1 ￿ q the group is not split up. Instead a randomly
selected individual in the group is eliminated.
17That link is not intrinsic. Both Wright (1945) and Maynard Smith (1964) disregard reproductive
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The fact that the group can split in two only after it has reached the size n implies
that the model is a reproductive externality model. However, to make it mathematically
tractable, Traulsen and Nowak focus on the special case when q is very small, instead
stressing the ￿xation e⁄ect. The authors analytically show that the smaller the group
size and the more numerous the groups, the higher will the probability be that altruists
will dominate the entire population.
Traulsen and Nowak then substantially extend Wright￿ s model. They show that
the probability that altruists will dominate the population increases with q: The reason
is that as q increases it pays o⁄ relatively more to be in a group that has reached
the size n; which groups with many altruists reach faster than other groups. In that
sense the ￿xation result is an extreme result, giving a lower bound to the probability
of altruists thriving in the population. Traulsen and Nowak also extend the model to
include migration and multilevel selection. As in Wright (1945) and Maynard Smith
(1964), increased migration makes it more di¢ cult to sustain cooperation.
It is interesting to note that the ￿xation approach to group selection implies that
somewhere in the human species￿distant past there was a golden era for the evolution
of social preferences. However, as mobility increased the circumstance under which
altruism was created ceased to exist. In a somewhat related empirical study, Henrich
et al (2001) let subjects from 15 small scale societies play the ultimatum game.18 They
found that the modal o⁄ers were between 15 and 50 percent, while it is typically 50
percent in industrialized societies. Mean o⁄ers varied between 26 and 58 percent, while
it is typically 44 percent in industrialized societies. Thus, Henrich et al￿ s ￿ndings do not
indicate that industrialized societies have less altruists than other societies. If anything,
the results rather suggest the contrary.
6. Assortative group formation
Wilson (1975) was the ￿rst to analyze how assortative group formation could lead to
altruism being sustainable. While earlier models argued that isolation was a precondi-
tion for altruism to thrive, Wilson￿ s model can instead be interpreted as a model were
groups are reshu› ed in every period. However, for altruists to survive in such a model,
being an altruist and being matched with an altruist should be correlated.
Wilson notes that this can be achieved through various venues. Group formation
based on kin is one of them, but this is only a special case. In subsequent work, e.g.
in Sober and Wilson (1998) and Wilson and Dugatkin (1997), the author has discussed
various structures that can result in assortative group formation.
Here we will discuss two mechanisms through which assortative groups may arise.
First we will discuss the possibility of there being a conformist bias in imitation. Second
we will discuss signalling.
6.1. Conformist bias. Experiments in social psychology has established that there
seems to be a tendency for individuals to conform to other individuals￿opinions.19 Such
18This is a two player game where one player is given a sum of money and the possibility to divide
it with the other player. If the other player rejects the division, then neither player gets anything. If
he accepts, then that division is executed.
19See Aronson, Wilson, and Akert (2007) and DeLamater and Myers (2007) for textbook treatments
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conformity can be of two types. It can be an informative in￿ uence in the sense that
other individuals￿opinions may reveal useful information. It can also be a normative
in￿ uence in the sense that individuals may attach an intrinsic value to conforming.20
If the conformist bias is important then it would lead to a fairly strong positive
correlation between cooperating and being in groups that cooperate. This would thus
lead to these groups performing better than other groups. However, to the extent that it
is still better to deviate, or not be a conformist, this behavior would not be evolutionary
viable.
Boyd and Richerson (1985) argued that individuals using an imitation rule with a
conformist bias will be selected for. They argue that once a majority in the population
has adopted a new and better behavior, then it is better to imitate that majority
rather than to use an unbiased imitation rule. However, one could argue that when
the majority has not yet adopted this new behavior, then it would be better to use an
unbiased imitation rule - and even better to use a payo⁄ biased imitation rule.
Henrich and Boyd (1998) considered both individual learning and social learning.
They compared an unbiased random rule with a conformist rule in a computer sim-
ulation, and found that the conformist rule would survive if the environment did not
change too often. Individual learning is in general better than social learning if a new
and better technology is only used by a small fraction of the population. However, this
is also when a conformist bias would perform badly compared to an unbiased imitation
rule. Thus a conformist bias is not really better than no bias per se. It is simply that
in situations when no bias are better than conformity, then social learning itself will
not be successful.21
In essence, a conformist rule is better than an unbiased rule if a majority uses the
best strategy. Then individuals using the conformist rule will shift over to the best
strategy faster than individuals using an unbiased rule. However, the converse is also
true. If the majority uses a bad strategy, then individuals using the conformist rule
will shift to the best strategy slower than individuals using an unbiased rule. Eriksson
et al (2007) modi￿ed Henrich and Boyd￿ s model to prolong the period when a new and
better technology is used by a minority. As a result, a conformist bias seems never to
be an evolutionary stable strategy - although it seemed to be under some parameter
values in Henrich and Boyd￿ s setting.
The idea of a conformist bias being the crucial mechanism to uphold altruism is
an interesting one. In particular its proponents have noted that it may serve to favor
cooperation also in very large groups. However, it should be noted that although
conformism may lead to cooperation, it is also costly for the conformist. Thus, if we
invoke exogenous conformity then we somewhat push the problem with defectors outside
the model. Henrich and Boyd (2001) have attempted to somewhat address this issue.
They consider a Prisoner￿ s dilemma augmented by i stages of punishments. I.e. in the
￿rst stage those that did not cooperate in the Prisoner￿ s dilemma are punished. In all
20Henrich and Boyd (2001) argues that conformist transmission amounts to "using the popularity
of a choice as an indirect measure of its worth". This would thus amount to informative conformism
discounted by the risk of the measure being incorrect.
21Also see Wakano and Aoki (2007) and Nakahashi (2007) for a fuller treatment of Henrich and
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stages after that people who did not punish in the previous stage are punished. The
payo⁄di⁄erence between a payo⁄biased rule and a conformity biased rule decreases for
every stage. Eventually, in stage i; if everybody has at least some conformity in them,
this will outweigh the urge to consider the payo⁄, and everybody will conform - and
punish. Since everybody punishes in stage i; everybody will also punish in stage i ￿ 1.
The backward induction is not perfect though. If there are su¢ ciently large bene￿ts
from defection, then everybody will still defect in the Prisoner￿ s dilemma. Nevertheless,
if these gains are not large enough, then cooperation will be sustained. The result is
that the game has two Nash equilibria, one with defection and no punishment, and the
other with cooperation and punishment to the ith level. Adding group selection to the
model, the authors argue that the last equilibrium would be chosen.
GuzmÆn et al (2007) perform simulations to compare an imitation rule with a payo⁄
bias with an imitation rule with a conformist bias. Individuals are only allowed to
imitate other individuals within their own group. This means that the group selection
e⁄ect disappears completely for payo⁄ imitating individuals, who will never cooperate.
Conformity imitating individuals, on the other hand, will sometimes end up in groups
with many cooperators, and will then reap the group selection bene￿ts through their
imitating rule. The crucial mechanism in GuzmÆn et al is thus that individuals with
a payo⁄ bias will only imitate other group members. Thus, the players in this model
seem to have fairly limited cognitive abilities. It would be interesting to let the players
mental abilities grow, so that they also can imitate other players outside their own
group. It seems likely that then a payo⁄ bias would be favored instead of a conformist
bias, suggesting that this type of conformity may have been an advantage early in
human development, but since then has become a liability.
Richerson and Boyd (2005) argue that culture would tend to favor a conformist rule.
Nevertheless, it seems that a conformist biased rule does not seem to be particularly
conducive to technological innovations compared to a payo⁄biased rule. The incentives
to innovate will be lower, as will the possibilities to spread new innovations. It is
only after an innovation has been made, and after a majority has accepted it, that a
conformist bias will perform as well as a payo⁄ biased imitation rule. Thus, it could
indeed be the case that a conformist bias is particularly ill suited for a species where
innovations play such an important role as for humans. In addition, to the extent that
new and better technologies make groups more successful, it seems that group selection
itself would favor a payo⁄ biased rule rather than a conformist biased rule.
6.2. Signalling. Another approach towards assortative group formation is to con-
sider signalling before groups are formed. To my knowledge a formal analysis of such
a game has not been made.22 However, GrØgoire and Robson (2003) analyze a some-
what similar game. They add the possibility of sending a costly signal before playing a
Prisoner￿ s Dilemma, and then add a group structure to the game.
The problem with signalling before playing a prisoner￿ s dilemma, is of course that
individuals will be prone to lie. A signal is not a commitment. Even if it is a costly
signal, it will be subgame perfect to deviate from it. To make it possible to avoid being
taken advantage o⁄ by the defectors, GrØgoire and Robson allows for a strategy called
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the secret handshake. This is a promise to cooperate that is only understood by other
secret handshakers. In addition, somebody who plays the secret handshake will indeed
cooperate when the game is played. The authors also allow for a strategy that takes
advantage of secret handshakers. This strategy is called the sucker punch. Somebody
who plays the sucker punch sends the secret handshake signal, but then deviates when
the game is played.
The authors start o⁄ with a one-population game. Each player plays a round robin
and gets the average payo⁄. All players then imitate the strategy that earns the high-
est payo⁄. Thus, if the entire population is playing defect without a signal, then the
population can be invaded by two secret handshake players. The reason is that the
secret handshakers will cooperate when playing with each other, but defect when play-
ing with everybody else. The defectors, on the other hand, will always defect. The
secret handshakers will thus earn a higher payo⁄ than the defectors, and take over the
population. However, this makes it possible for one sucker punch player to invade the
population. Finally, when the population is dominated by sucker punch players, then
one non-signaling defector may invade the population. As these defectors take over
the population, it again becomes possible for two secret handshake players to invade
it. Given that the secret handshake needs two mutations to invade a population, while
both the sucker punch and the non-signalling defectors only need one mutation, the
population will most of the time consist of defectors.
The authors then add a group structure to the model. Players are ￿rst playing
within the group. They play against all other players in the group and receive the
average payo⁄. All players in each group then imitate the highest yielding strategy in
that group. Players are then playing a second round, again within the group, but now
they instead imitate the highest yielding strategy in the entire population. Thus, if at
least one group happens to be in a cooperative state, then the entire population will
switch to that state. As a result, GrØgoire and Robson (2003) show that if there are at
least three groups, then all stochastically stable states involve cooperation.
To see this, suppose that the entire population is defecting, without sending any
signals. A mutation to two secret handshakers within a group would then transform
that group into secret handshakers and then transform the entire population to secret
handshakers. To leave this state it is required that each group has a simultaneously
mutation to at least one sucker puncher. Naturally, the more groups there are, the less
likely is this to happen.
Although the signal is made after groups are formed, it seems that the logic of
GrØgoire and Robson (2003) would translate also into a setting where individuals ￿rst
signal, then are put into groups, and ￿nally play a Prisoner￿ s Dilemma. In fact, then it
seems it would su¢ ce with two mutations to secret handshakers in the entire population
- as opposed to within the same group - to transform ￿rst one group and then the entire
population into secret handshakers. Such a population would be di¢ cult to invade
for sucker punchers though. A sucker puncher would transform his group into sucker
punchers, but that group would then be transformed back to secret handshakers in the
group stage. Thus, for sucker punchers to take over the population there must ￿rst be
su¢ ciently many mutations to sucker punchers, and then at least one would have to
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has not yet been explored formally.
An example of signalling that seems be at work both at the group formation stage
and at the strategy selection stage is quorum sensing. This phenomenon has been
observed especially in bacteria, but also in some social insects. Bacteria that use quorum
sensing secrete a signalling substance as a function of how much of the substance it can
sense in its vicinity. This can create a feed-back loop attracting and inducing ever more
bacteria to secrete the substance. At a certain threshold, the bacteria can sense that
they are in su¢ cient numbers to achieve a certain e⁄ect, e.g. bioluminescence, and can
then trigger the necessary behavior to achieve that e⁄ect.23 The phenomenon has been
quite thoroughly empirically studied, but it at this point it is not certain whether it is
altruistic or if group selection is involved.24
7. Reproductive externalities
Many activities create externalities for others. That is, an organism￿ s behavior will
a⁄ect also other organisms￿ ￿tness, without this e⁄ect on others a⁄ecting the ￿rst
organism￿ s ￿tness. In economics this is called an externality. Externalities can be
internalized through di⁄erent avenues. In some cases, such as air pollution, extended
property rights - i.e. rights to pollute - makes this possible. In other cases, such as
defense or public roads, a central authority can at least partially ensure that such public
goods are provided. In other cases, although much less explored, competition between
companies may lead to higher e¢ ciency within each company.25 In biology a natural
way to internalize externalities is through group selection. Groups that provide the
public good will be more successful than others, which will lead to provision of that
public good to spread. Weibull and Salomonsson (2006) call externalities relevant for
organisms￿￿tness reproductive externalities.26
Several group selection papers have implicitly used reproductive externalities. Typ-
ically, as in Canals and Vega-Redondo (1998), Vega-Redondo (1996), and Traulsen and
Nowak (2006), a group is disbanded at some exogenous probability, and high-yielding
groups then have a possibility to colonize the disbanded group￿ s niche or territory. Be-
ing a high-yield group is thus a public good. To the extent that they a⁄ect the provision
of this public good, individual behavior consequently have reproductive externalities -
and they can be at least partly internalized through group selection. Other papers, such
as Weibull and Salomonsson (2006), and Killingback et al (2006) are more explicitly
concerned with externalities and public goods.
Canals and Vega-Redondo (1998) generalize the stochastic evolutionary model of
Kandori, Mailath, and Rob (1993) into a group selection model. Individuals are subject
both to individual selection and a small mutation rate. The individuals are divided into
groups, and these groups are disbanded at some rate and replaced by new groups. The
members in the new groups can either imitate strategies that earn the highest average
23I am gratful to Olof Leimar for the pointer.
24See Joint, Downie, and Williams (2007) for a full issue of Philosphical Transactions B dedicated
to quorum sensing.
25Examples are Boyer and OrlØan (1992), Vega-Redondo (1993), Sj￿str￿m and Weitzman (1996)
and Weibull (2000).
26In biology the term by-product has sometimes been used to describe externalities, see e.g. Connor
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payo⁄in the general population, or imitate the strategies in the group with the highest
payo⁄. Any weight on the latter imitation rule is thus a weight on group selection.
Canals and Vega-Redondo then look at Coordination Games, in particular Stag Hunt
games exempli￿ed in game (2) earlier. As Kandori, Mailath and Rob showed, there will
be a mutation force within each group leading to the evolutionary process spending
most of its time close to the risk dominant equilibrium. The strength of that mutation
force will be very weak if the mutation rate is very small. In Kandori, Mailath and
Rob￿ s setting this does not matter. However, with Canals and Vega-Redondo￿ s group
structure there is a counter balancing force. Each time a group is disbanded a proportion
of the new members will imitate the strategies played in the groups with the highest
payo⁄. Letting the mutation rate go to zero, the authors show that group selection
will be a much stronger force, and the system will spend most of its time at the Pareto
dominant equilibrium, rather than at the risk dominant equilibrium.
The setup in Vega-Redondo (1996) is similar to Canals and Vega-Redondo (1998),27
but he only lets new group members imitate strategies from groups with the highest
payo⁄. Furthermore, instead of considering a Coordination Game, a Prisoner￿ s Dilemma
is considered. As long as the mutation rate is su¢ ciently small, Vega-Redondo￿ s model
result in a stochastic process spending most of its time with all groups composed of
cooperating individuals.
In similar models, Vega-Redondo (1993) and Sj￿str￿m and Weitzman (1996) discuss
the e⁄ect of competition on ￿rms￿e¢ ciency. Within companies, employees have an
incentive to shirk. However, if they do so, then their companies run a larger risk of
going bankrupt, implying unemployment for the sta⁄. Vega-Redondo (1993) considers a
stag hunt game, whereas Sj￿str￿m and Weitzman (1996) consider a prisoner￿ s dilemma.
In both cases the total outcome is that competition between ￿rms hinders shirking
within ￿rms. In the setting of Sj￿str￿m and Weitzman (1996) a technical issue arises
with a ￿nite number of ￿rms. Then it is possible that simultaneous degeneration across
all ￿rms lead to a long run degeneration of the entire population. However, they show
that with an in￿nitesimal probability of exogenous mutations in favor of cooperation,
this degenerative tendency will lead to the same qualitative results as with an in￿nite
number of ￿rms. Weibull (2000) extends the basic textbook Cournot model to take
into account managerial owners￿trade-o⁄ between pro￿t and e⁄ort. The result is that
sti⁄er competition leads to a higher e⁄ort from managerial owners, i.e. a higher internal
e¢ ciency.
Weibull and Salomonsson (2006) consider both positive and negative reproductive
externalities. When externalities are positive, for example when a parent protects the
group￿ s young, they foster altruism. When they are negative, for example in competition
for mates or food, they foster spite.
The model consists of a ￿nite, but large population. Groups of two players are
randomly, and non-assortatively, formed in every period. The group members play
the game once and receive the material payo⁄s in terms of o⁄spring. Survival of the
o⁄spring, or e⁄ective payo⁄, depends on a function ￿ that depends on both group
27The ￿rst version of Canals and Vega-Redondo (1998) was published in 1994 as a Universidad de
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member￿ s material payo⁄s. This is thus the group selection element in the model. The
group members and their surviving o⁄spring is then returned to the population and
a new round starts. The function ￿ can be speci￿ed to include both within group
competition, fostering spite; and within group cooperation, fostering altruism.
Weibull and Salomonsson ￿rst consider symmetric 2￿2￿games, and then show that
when breeding is cooperative, then some games that are Prisoner￿ s Dilemma games in
material payo⁄s are transformed to either Coordination Games, Hawk-Dove games or
E¢ cient Dominance Solvable games in e⁄ective payo⁄s. As a result, an observer only
looking at material payo⁄s would conclude that the players were altruistic, whereas
he would conclude that they were sel￿sh if he looked at e⁄ective payo⁄s. In contrast,
when breeding is competitive, then some Coordination Games, some Hawk-Dove games,
and some E¢ cient Dominance Solvable games are instead transformed to Prisoner￿ s
Dilemma games.
In a more general formulation, and taking into account both cooperative and com-
petitive breeding, Weibull and Salomonsson derive social preferences re￿ ecting both
altruism and spite. The derived preferences qualitatively agree with those discussed
in Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Charness and Rabin (2002). They are, for exam-
ple, consistent with costly punishment.28;29 Furthermore, they are also consistent with
rejections of ￿unfair￿o⁄ers that have been observed in ultimatum game experiments.
Since groups are reshu› ed in every period, these social preferences will be robust to
migration. In contrast to the ￿xation approach, the reproductive externalities approach
does not hinge on groups being isolated for long periods of time. Nevertheless, Williams
(1966) also argued that migration would result in all groups being so similar that
selection between them would at best be a very weak force. This argument has been
empirically refuted by Bowles (2006) who, based on genetic data from recent hunter-
gatherer populations, argues that ￿genetic di⁄erences between early human groups are
likely to have been great enough so that lethal intergroup competition could account
for the evolution of altruism￿ .
Instead social preferences based on reproductive externalities hinge on the existence
of public goods. The existence of such goods have presumably varied extensively during
history, but can also be assumed to vary across current societies. Thus, a cultural
interpretation of the theory could be used to explain the variability of social preferences
between societies, as studied by Henrich et al (2001). Note that, in contrast to the
￿xation approach, there is nothing in this approach that indicates that social preferences
should deteriorate as migration increases. In fact, to the extent that an increase in
migration coincides with more public goods, social preferences could in fact become even
stronger. Interestingly, in the study by Henrich et al, it was found that in societies where
28Also see Herold (2004) for an account of how costly punishment and rewarding may be fostered in
a group selection model based on reproductive externalities. Technically, Herold￿ s model is based on
reproductive externalities since the players know the composition of their groups. Boyd et al (2003)
have looked at a similar model using simulation methods.
29There is a fairly large literature on costly, or altruistic, punishment. E.g. Boyd et al (2003) has
argued that costly punishment is altruistic since it may serve to uphold cooperation. However, Dreber
et al (2008) present experimental evidence suggesting that punishment rather triggers retaliations and
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payo⁄s to cooperation was high, o⁄ers in the ultimatum game were also higher. This
result is in line with social preferences being fostered in a cultural model of reproductive
externalities.
The ability to internalize reproductive externalities will be smaller in larger groups
- and still we can observe that humans are often organized in nations of millions,
sometimes billions of people. Despite the fact that humans can be organized in very
large groups, sociological studies typically report that humans have remarkably few
close friends. McPherson et al (2006) reported that the average American in 2004
only had 2.08 close friends with whom to discuss important matters. Although the
number was down from 2.94 in 1985, it is striking that this number is much smaller
than the number of acquaintances that our brains are thought to be able to handle.
Dunbar (1998) argues that our neocortical processing capacity limits the number of
acquaintances we are able to keep track of to 150 individuals. It may be that by
allowing for networks and hierarchies it would be possible to reconcile these apparent
contradictions.
Killingback et al (2006) allow for di⁄erent group sizes. They consider a public
goods game. Individuals are asked to contribute to a common pool. The contributions
are then multiplied by a su¢ ciently large factor and distributed equally among the
individuals. The factor is su¢ ciently large in the sense that in small populations it
makes it a unique evolutionary stable strategy to contribute, while it does not make
it an evolutionary stable strategy to contribute in large populations. Instead, in large
populations, the evolutionary stable strategy is to not contribute. Killingback et al
(2006) simulate the results in a model where group sizes are variable. The fact that
the number of small groups is non-zero leads to contributions in the overall population
being non-zero.
8. Conclusion
Group selection has typically been used to address two issues: equilibrium selection
and altruism. The equilibrium selection issue - illustrated by the Coordination Games
- has never really been controversial. The recent literature has instead focused on
more complex issues, like whether group selection can lead to the Pareto dominant
equilibrium, instead of the risk dominant equilibrium, being stochastically stable. As
Canals and Vega-Redondo (1998) have shown, that is indeed the case.
Group selection as an explanation of altruism - illustrated by the Prisoner￿ s Dilemma
games - has been more controversial. The ￿rst formal models by Wright (1945) and
Maynard Smith (1964) argued that group selection could only promote altruism if pure
groups of altruists were allowed to be isolated for long periods. However, since then
group selection has also been found to work through assortative group formation and
reproductive externalities.
Group selection based on assortative group formation begs the question of how
assortion comes about. A strand of the literature has focused on a conformity bias
in imitation which could create assortion, whereas signalling as a means of obtaining
assorted groups seems to have been somewhat neglected. An interesting aspect with
signalling is that the interpretation of signals will involve culture. E.g. di⁄erent cultures
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Group selection based on reproductive externalities has been more successful. Vega-
Redondo (1996) has shown that it group selection with reproductive externalities will
make altruism viable, whereas Weibull and Salomonsson (2006) have shown that re-
productive externalities can result in social preferences discussed by Fehr and Schmidt
(1999) and Charness and Rabin (2002). In addition Bowles (2006) have shown empiri-
cally that genetic di⁄erences between early human groups seems to have been su¢ cient
to foster altruism.
Much empirical work remains to be done. For example, it would be interesting
to compare the predictions of the ￿xation approach to the approach of reproductive
externalities. The ￿xation approach predicts that altruism will increase if migration
decreases, while the reproductive externalities approach suggests that altruism will
increase if the positive externalities increases - as long as they can be internalized
through group selection. It would be interesting to see whether these predictions are
borne out, and, if so, which approach has more explanatory value. This may also calm
some fears that our societies￿increased mobility will lead to less altruism, and thus
eventually the demise of civilized society. If the increased mobility also creates more
positive externalities that we can try to internalize, then it may in fact lead to more
altruism rather than less.
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